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Abstract: Interreligious dialogue is an important communications activity that has many of the
characteristics and problems of new religious movements. Failure can be devastating, and yet scant
critical attention has been devoted to assessing the legitimate qualifications of event participants.
Seven dialogic parameters were identified and explicated pertaining to: (a) sanctioning, (b)
representation, (c) relevancy, (d) knowledge, (e) technical competence, (f) articulation, and (g)
appropriateness. Professional awareness of their range, depth and contours has important
ramifications for participant selection, preparation and event organisation. 
Introduction
Nowadays, religious dialoguing is “a necessity and a duty in a pluralist society” (Zago, 2000, p. 16),
especially  given  the  demise  of  church  isolationism  and  official  estrangement  policies.  Indeed,
knowingly “to refuse dialogue today would be an act of fundamental human irresponsibility—in
Judeo-Christian-Muslin terms, a sin” (Swidler, 1996, p. 16). So, it is not surprising to discover that
dialoguing has fast become “an imperative of our common existence and survival” (Rambachan,
1999, p. 56) or for Leonard Swidler (1990b, p. vii) to earnestly argue that the “future offers two
alternatives: death or dialogue. This statement is not over-dramatization.” Prof. Swidler envisaged
the  demise  of  the  “Age of  Monologue”  and the rise  of  the “Age of  Dialogue” because of  the
interpenetration of the world’s peoples and their problems. Indeed, it is also the inbreaking “Age of
Global Dialogue” given the historical transformation of Christendom into Western Civilization and
now into Global Civilization (Swidler, 1996, p. 1).
Dialoguing is certainly a tough job demanding “the intellectual, moral, and, at the limit, religious
ability to struggle to hear another and to respond. To respond critically, and even suspiciously when
necessary” (Tracy, 1990, p. 4). There are many problems with the selection, nature and preparation
of dialogue participants, but despite its obviousness, scant critical attention has been devoted to this
need. Seven dialogic parameters were identified within the literature, namely: (a) Participant
Sanctioning: Official Recognition, (b) Representation: Are Participants Truly Faithful to the Faith?,
(c) Relevancy: Insiders or Outsiders of the Faith?, (d) Knowledgeable: Understanding Oneself and
the Other, (e) Technical Competence: Argumentation and Presentation Skills, (f) Articulate:
Knowing the Language of the Dialogue, and (g) Appropriateness: Issues of Dress and Other
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Nonverbal Behaviours. The following is a brief explication of these seven issues.
Participant Sanctioning: Official Recognition
Legitimate  dialogue  requires  participants  who  are  carefully  selected,  approved  and  officially
sanctioned by the appropriate authorities, whether by Bishop, congregation, roshi, Bet Din, Central
Committee etc. They must be “capable of dialogue” to use Jürgen Moltmann’s (2000, p. 18) phrase.
That is, “interest in the other religion, an open-minded awareness of its different life, and the will to
live together - what Theo Sundermeier calls ‘convivence’ (Spanish convivencia).” Why? To ensure
the success of the specific dialogue, the dialogic enterprise, and the reputation of the faiths involved.
As Prof. Eric J. Sharpe (1992) pointed out:
To most Christians, a Hindu is a Hindu is a Hindu. No doubt to most Hindus, there would
be no appreciable difference between Ian Paisley and Cardinal Ratzinger. The terms of the
dialogue, however, are dictated not by what the textbooks tell you that each religion is or
ought to be, but by who happens to be doing the talking, and under what conditions (p. 231).
Official religious dialogue is best viewed as a corporate activity where the chosen dialoguer is the
faith,  organisationally speaking.  It  is  imperative  that  the  appointee(s)  “come to  the  dialogue as
persons somehow significantly identified with a religious [or ideological]  community” (Swidler,
1982, p. 10). If “a person is, for example, neither a Lutheran or a Jew, s/he could not engage in a
specifically Lutheran-Jewish dialogue” (Swidler, 1990c, p. 59). The chosen representatives must
also have the power commensurate with the task to avoid counter-productivity issues. Indeed:
It is a frequent experience that groups with a mandate from their communities to engage in
dialogue draw up a coherent and far-reaching statement that represents real progress in
mutual understanding among the partners to the dialogue, only to find at the end of their
labors that the respective mandating authorities in their own communities will not approve
the statement. Such statements are then frequently reduced to rather unsatisfactory evasions
and compromises that were already in vogue before the dialogue was set up (Hellwig, 1982,
p. 78).
The need for official authorisations was specifically recommended by the Aarhus Workshop (1978)
regarding the Christian-Marxist dialogue:
Only if the church has participatory exercise of power and decision-making will it have the
internal and external authority to engage in critical involvement with Marxism. It will then
create a publicly visible example which will set a criterion for the whole of society. It will
witness in its life to the reality of “the universal priesthood of the baptized” it professes (p.
77).
This authorisation principle also applies to the integrity of the delegates chosen because anyone
“who thinks they will be betraying their faith cannot and should not enter the dialogue” (Coff, 1989,
p. 209). Regrettably, there are scant case reports but at least one tantalisingly brief, unexplicated
aside,  namely: “I also include the sufferings of those Christians and Marxists  who entered into
dialogue “without  permission”  by their  respective  establishments”  (Romic,  1978,  pp.  123-124).
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Rev. Crow Jr.  (2000,  p.  96) hinted  at  another  source of participant  difficulty when he advised
potential  career  dialoguers:  “Do  not  seek  or  yearn  for  any exalted  position  in  the  ecumenical
movement until  you are seventy years of age. In the meantime, practice humility, patience, and
evangelization.” Overall,  the “problem of Christian faith in a religiously plural  world cannot be
solved by ex-Christians learning to relate to ex-Jews, ex-Buddhists,  ex-Muslims,  or ex-anything
else, in the name of conceptions that do not take these traditions seriously” (Dawe, 1978, p. 17).
Representation: Are Participants Truly Faithful to the Faith?
Delegates must, in some fundamental way, truly represent their faiths and be comfortable in that
role, or as Jürgen Moltmann (2000) put it:
Only people who have arrived at a firm standpoint in their own religion, and who enter into
dialogue with the resulting self-confidence, merit dialogue. It is only if we are at home in
our own religion that we shall be able to encounter the religion of someone else” (pp. 18-
19).
Consequently,  one  needs  to  ask:  “who are  these  dialogue  partners?  Are  they the  elite  and  the
intellectuals? Do they really represent their societies or are they only fans of dialogue?” (Younan,
1995,  p.  17).  This  is  important  because  “no  dialogue  partners  can  possibly  speak  for  all  the
segments  of  Buddhism  any more  than  any Christian  theologian  can  speak  for  all  branches  of
Christianity” (Cobb Jr., 1982, pp. x-xi). After all:
...there are a host of different versions of both Islam and Christianity and no single
individual adherent of either religion is fully representative of the entire spectrum. There is
all the more reason, therefore, for inter-religious dialogue on the international level to be
conducted between and among representative bodies of the religions concerned (Brockway,
1984, p. 14).
As Prof. Harvey Cox (1989) put it:
...in the ideal interreligious dialogue, we will have all the Hindus on one side of the table,
all the Christians on another side, all the Jews on a third, and all the Muslims at a fourth.
The truth is that there are elements within any of these movements that are more like those
within another tradition than they are like certain elements within their own (p. 60).
Finding delegates who are representative, loyal, and follow the religious party line is not going to be
easy. As evidenced by “the Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith [who] has declared
that  Professors  Hans Kung and Charles Curran are  no longer  considered  Catholic  theologians”
(Swidler, 1990c, p. 60).
Nor is  it  too surprising to  hear  that  “the  processes  of  official  dialogue or  negotiation  between
denominations  must  be  entrusted  to  relatively small  numbers  of  elected  or  appointed  persons”
(Black, 1991, p. 7), and/or “with small groups that represent the grassroots” (Younan, 1995, p. 17).
It is certainly counterproductive having persons attend conferences representing “the faith” when
they  are  only  a  minor,  non-representative  faction.  It  would  give  a  misleading,  inaccurate  and
distorted picture of the faith per se, especially to those unfamiliar with the religion in question, let
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alone its various shadings and off-shoots. For example:
When a Zoroastrian approaches the question of dialogue with another religion, due
attention has to be paid to the divergent currents of interpretations prevalent in the
Zoroastrian tradition itself. There are some who interpret texts philologically, others
esoterically. Theosophists, or those influenced by Hindu philosophy, would explain
Zoroastrianism from their particular perspective. It is persistent [sic] to know who the
spokesman is (Dhalla, 1989, p. 40).
Of course, the same rule applies to dialogue with non-religious ideologies:
As with their secular counterparts, secular ideologies exist in a variety of subtraditions...the
doctrines of Soviet Marxism diverge from those of Maoist China or Albania; the humanism
of Julian Huxley (with its emphasis on evolution) differs from the more ‘literary’, symbol-
oriented outlook of Jungian psychoanalysis; the existentialism of Heidegger is very different
from the more socially activist version of Satre (Smart, 1991, p. 170).
Even within a secular ideology, there can be a diversity of focuses, as occurred during the 1986
Catholic-Marxist dialogue in Budapest:
The first things that struck the Catholics was the great variety of positions among their
Marxists partners--a variety unthinkable fifteen years ago. Some Marxists were ready to
admit the presence of injustices, inequalities and the erosion of moral values in Socialist
societies. Some questioned Communist certainties like the all-sufficiency of science and the
adequacy of mere structural changes (one of the participants had publicly questioned, prior
to the meetings, the justice of imposing a one-party dictatorship). Some of the Marxists
tended to reach back to the young Marx, to stress the humanist aspect of Marxism rather
than its scientific nature, to give precedence to the development of the human person and
society over class-warfare and to the interests of the entire humanity over those of one
particular class (Pereira, 1987, p. 274).
Similar concerns were raised with new religious movements:
...any individual Methodist may or may not conform (intellectually) to the norms of
evangelical Arminianism or (ethically) to the well-known taboos on the use of alcohol or
tobacco, so individual Unificationists may be (intellectually) more or less clear on the
Divine Principle or (ethically) more or less committed to the marriage customs of that
church...No one person anywhere is the embodiment of or personification of ideas or beliefs
that are set out systematically in text books for the convenience of students and other
interested outsiders (Cracknell, 1987, pp. 158-159).
Indeed,  why  “should  the  dialogues  invite  only  the  modernized  version  of  religions  whose
representatives  may  be  merely a  minority  of  enlightened  liberals  which  scarcely any religious
constituency to speak of?” (Braaten, 1992, p. 10).
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Do these invited representatives “think of themselves as ‘representative’ at all, or do they state that
it is a very personal voice with which they speak, even though an important part of that voice is their
religious affiliation within a cumulative tradition” (Morgan, 1995, p. 162)? As Munib A. Younan
(1995) argued:
I believe that the future fruitful dialogue must involve the different representation that
reflects the reality of the society. To have people who represent their own ideas and agreed
on every item on the agenda is not a healthy dialogue, but is rather a monologue or
deceptive and will not proliferate justice, peace and reconciliation. It is now time to involve
those that represent the proponents and opponents in one’s society (p. 17).
It  is  somewhat  ironic  that  the most  qualified faith representatives,  its  leaders,  are ineligible for
dialoguing precisely because of their leadership status:
Who participates in authentic interreligious dialogue? Do we ever see the Pope sitting down
with the Ayatollah, or either sharing with the Chief Rabbis of Israel? No, we do not. Why?
Because these men cannot accept “Not in Heaven” [recognising their religion’s limitations]
as a prerequisite for genuine dialogue. As defenders of particular and mutually exclusive
faith traditions, the best these men could hope for is a cordial exchange of doctrine
(Shapiro, 1989, p. 34).
It was a point demonstrated by the leader of the Unification Church, Rev. Sun Myung Moon when
he addressed an interreligious event sponsored by his Church:
Moon’s own speech at the Assembly bore more than a hint of a Unificationist agenda. He
saw religions aimed at an ideal individual, family, nation, and world (the four stages of
restoration), declaring that the salvation of fallen humanity will be completed by God’s
providence through the Messiah. (One presumes he was referring to himself). Of course, it
could be argued that Moon, like other religious leaders, was exercising his right to present
his own religious heritage (Moss & Chryssides, 1986, p. 13).
As all true believers should be allowed too! Even the officially approved representatives are rarely
ever the faith’s establishment spokespersons:
...genuine dialoguers, while deeply rooted in their faith, are the risk takers, the radicals, the
prophets who are not afraid to affirm wonder wherever it is revealed. While participants
may be and often are abbots, roshis, gurus, priests, imams, established scholars, rabbis, and
others whose positions in their respective communities may well be exalted, they are
nonetheless not the official spokespersons of their faith. They represent not so much the
tradition to which they belong, but themselves and the spiritual quest they personally
undertake...Genuine dialoguers are rare and wonderful people (Shapiro, 1989, p. 35).
This radicalisation phenomenon was also noted during one Marxist-Christian dialogue:
One ought to mention that the “revisionist” Marxists are the ones who support the dialogue
most ardently. They are sometimes very popular, but they are rarely in the position to make
an impact in their own societies, because they are very definitely opposed in those efforts by
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the orthodox Marxists (Romic, 1978, p. 124).
Kate  Zebiri  (1997)  noted  how Muslim-Christian  dialogues  could  be  politically  constricted  and
internally biased by liberals:
...the few Muslim initiatives have tended to be on the official government level, for example
in Libya, Tunisia and Jordan. The problem of representation is not easy to resolve on the
Muslim side; governments do not necessarily have strong Islamic credibility, the ‘ulama’
(Muslim religious scholars) are not always willing to participate, and when they do they are
often either representing their governments or constrained by government views. Most of
those who have participated as individuals have been from the liberal end of the Islamic
spectrum, often resident in the West or having spent time there (pp. 35-36).
Similar  points  were  made  by  John  Baldock  (1994),  Secretary  General  World  Conference  on
Religion and Peace/Australia, which had important public relations consequences because of it:
Many senior Church leaders avoid interreligious forums, as do some from other faiths who
are concerned to maintain factional loyalties...there is also a tendency in many
denominations to leave interreligious dialogue to those who are somewhat marginal within
their own structures. While obviously there are considerable time demands upon senior
religious leaders, this often creates a disparity in interfaith meetings. Some participants may
hold considerable representative status, while others will represent virtually no one at all. It
can also create an impression that the Churches are not really committed to building strong
relationships between faith communities, otherwise more senior representatives would be
found (p. 27).
Peggy Morgan (1995) also noted this marginalisation effect:
If an invitation arrives on the desk of the Archbishop of Canterbury for a member of the
Church of England to attend, will the person who volunteers or who is chosen to go be on
the periphery of the main tradition of that Church...In many religious communities interfaith
activity is not of central concern and those who are involved may well be on the boundaries
of their tradition...It does not mean, however, that the Anglican, for example, at an interfaith
gathering, may be an unusual Anglican, but may or may not choose to identify herself in
those terms (p. 162).
Interestingly,  Marcus  Braybrooke  (1993,  p.  105)  urged  dialoguers  to  become  aware  of  being
marginalised/alienated from their own tradition. Not only are marginalised persons chosen by their
faiths  as dialoguers because of their  marginality, but in Braybrooke’s view, dialoguing can also
make them marginalised. Such behaviour can also be a testing-the-water engagement tactic:
...it is important to be aware that, especially in the initial stages of any interreligious,
interideological dialogue, it is very likely that the literally ec-centric members of religious,
ideological communities will be the ones who will have the interest and ability to enter into
dialogue; the more centrist persons will do so only after the dialogue has proved safe for the
mainline, official elements to venture into (Swidler, 1990c, p. 60).
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Both  marginalisation  and  caution  is  to  be  expected  simply  because  dialogue  may  mean
transformation and growth, but it should not be necessarily feared.
John Baldock (1994) also raised the issue of representation. He asked whether the organisers of an
interreligious dialogue event should focus upon either: (a) involving people of goodwill but with
little or no representative status; or (b) bringing together those in established leadership positions
(presumably with high representative status).  Regrettably, no mention is  made of whether these
established leaders  with  high representative  status  are  of  goodwill,  but  from his  comment  that
“experience would suggest that it is difficult to combine both” (p. 27), it appears that he does not
think so. This is a pity because having established leaders with high representative status who are
also  of  goodwill  would  be  the  obvious  dialoguer  choice.  Nevertheless,  he  does  raise  a  very
interesting organisational idea, namely, that “a range of forums be organised involving people at
different  levels  of  denominational  status,  enabling  participation  for  all  those  willing  to  meet”
(Baldock, 1994, p. 27).
Although  Secretary  General  Baldock  (1994)  considered  forum  ranges  would  diminish  the
organisations  human  and financial  resources,  the  idea  has  intrinsic  merit  because  it  allows the
dialogue impulse to be fostered and nurtured in practice (instead of pleasing PR rhetoric). It also
provides valuable levels of dialogue experience for those willing, especially given the dearth of
dialogue training courses.  Indeed, if  each denomination adopted common standards of stratified
dialoguing it  would  ensure  quality control  and provide  a  graduated  training  ground  that  could
accommodate every skill level and aspiration. Baldock (1994) also raised the issue of women and
representation:
Most leadership positions within the various faith communities are held by men, also
raising the question of whether it is important to involve senior religious women in
gatherings among denominational leaders. This requires, however, a decision about who
are the most appropriate women to involve. Should it be the head of a religious women’s
organisation, or someone whose leadership is recognised according to different criteria? (p.
27).
The answer of course should be determined internally by the faiths themselves. However, as Harvey
Cox (1989, pp.  57-58) predicted: “I am convinced that,  when women become full  partners,  the
interreligious dialogue will change, so much so that what is now going on will be regarded as only
an insufficient and misleading beginning.”
Peggy Morgan (1995,  p.  162)  likewise  noted similar  gender disparities:  “If the participants  are
mainly leaders it is almost certain that there will be many fewer women than is typical of actual
membership within traditions.” Ursula King (1998, p. 44) was also justifiably annoyed because of
women’s invisibility at official dialogue events: “At present these [women’s own voices] are simply
unheard  and  presumed to  be  included  under  whatever  men  have  to  say about  dialogue.”  This
problem is  compounded  when  women are  actively excluded.  “Another  example  [of  shock and
exclusion]  was  that  of  two  distinguished  religious  scholars  dialoguing  with  each  other  on
spirituality, where one at least was adamant in not admitting a woman, however much experienced
in meditation and interfaith encounters, to this exclusive male dialogue.” It resulted in what the
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French call un dialogue des sourds (a dialogue of the deaf) (King, 1998, p. 43).
Although this may be demographically true, imposing gender requirements under whatever flavour
of political  correctness is  current  would be beyond the legitimate  scope of dialogue organisers.
However, it is an important topic to raise with the faiths themselves as they discuss what dialogue is
and  should  be  about.  Overall,  achieving  a  balance  between  bureaucratically  sanctioned
authorisation,  personalistic  radicalism,  marginality,  representative  status  and  gender  bias,  are
matters dialogue organisers and participants need to be cognisant of.
Relevancy: Insiders or Outsiders of the Faith?
As a corollary of the above, faiths have to decide if their official representatives, these “unusual”
(Morgan, 1995, p. 162), “rare and wonderful” (Shapiro, 1989, p. 35) people are insiders of the faith
(e.g., priests, active laity) or outsiders of the faith (e.g., professors of religion, but not members, or
ex-members of the faith). As John B. Cobb Jr. (1982, p. x) argued: “Too often in this country the
dialogue with representatives of other traditions has been in this way handed over to historians of
religion, many of whom are not committed to the Christian faith and its fresh articulation.” As Sallie
B. King (1990) argued:
Clearly, someone who has spent thirty years as a Zen master has the authority to speak for
the tradition, even if she is willing to acknowledge that exposure to Christianity has made
her see things in an altered light. The same applies to someone who has seminary training,
ordination, and thirty years in the ministry, or someone with a Ph.D. and personal
commitment in Christian theology or Buddhism (p. 124).
Yet, it is a decision that goes to the heart of dialoguing.
Whether  insiders  or  outsiders  are  ultimately  chosen  as  representatives,  they  must  at  least
think/believe/behave  like  true  religious  insiders.  Because  “a  theologian  enters  the  Buddhist-
Christian dialogue not as a cultural anthropologist nor even as a philosopher but as a committed
Christian theologian” (Tracy, 1990, p. 73). Indeed, Stanley J. Samartha (1981, p. 43) argued that
“people  who  enter  into  serious  dialogue  should  do  so  on  the  basis  of  commitments  to  their
respective faiths is obvious. The freedom to be committed and to be open is the prerequisite of
genuine dialogue,” as also advocated by Marcus Braybrooke (1993, p. 105) who considered it vital
that dialoguers “be secure in their own faith.”
Only when a religion has become my religion does the discussion about the truth reach its
deepest depths. Truth for me, therefore, means my faith, just as for the Jew and the Muslim,
Judaism and Islam, and for the Hindu and the Buddhist, Hinduism and Buddhism, are their
religion, their faith, and thereby the truth (Kung, 1988, p. 246).
Maurice Friedman (1987) wanted to extend the insider/outsider distinction beyond card-carrying,
organisational commitments to delegates who also actively lived their faith:
There has thrived in our day, unfortunately, a form of pseudo-dialogue in which official
representatives of religions carry on official dialogues that are neither genuine meetings of
religions, for religions cannot met, nor genuine meetings of persons because these persons
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speak only for their social role and do not stand behind what they say with their own
persons (p. 104).
Overall, the weight of opinion tends to favour having committed insiders because:
The best dialogue occurs when the partners are deeply convinced of many things. Truth is
best approached not by the absence of convictions but by submitting strong convictions to
the light of criticism. When one is really convinced, one does not fear such criticism or
expect, in advance, that criticism will greatly alter the conviction (Cobb Jr., 1982, p. 45).
Getting  committed  delegates  who  lived  their  faith  and  had  both  religious  and  academic
qualifications would be ideal (i.e., a priest-professor like Dr. Andrew Greeley). Alternatively, as a
compromise,  a  team dialogue  approach  using  both  elements  (i.e.,  a  priest  along  side  a  vetted
sympathetic professor). However, even here, care has to be taken because in reality, only a Jew can
know what it is like to be a Jew. As Jean-Claude Basset (1992, p. 37) stipulated in his 5th decalogue
dialogue  rule:  “There  is  no  real  inter-religious  dialogue  without  having one’s  roots  in  a  given
tradition and at the same time being open to others.” Since we live in an imperfect world, selecting
the  best  person  to  attend  official  events  will  always  be  difficult,  and  to  varying  degrees,  a
compromise choice.  As Prof.  Sharpe (1992, p. 233) noted: “genuine dialogue in depth between
devotees is, I am sure, a comparative rarity. Often what we have instead is a semi-secular dialogue
among the partly secularized, and between the secular fringe of the Church and the post-Christian
world out there.”
Such  delegate  choices  will  have  far  reaching ramifications,  especially for  minority faiths  (e.g.,
Tibetan Buddhism) who may not have articulate sacred servants who speak the language of the
dialogue (e.g., English). Therefore, using a professor of religion who speaks English and Tibetan,
and can perform as translator, would be better than having an inarticulate religious member, or no
dialogue  member  at  all!  This  arrangement  can  effectively overcome  many of  the  bureaucratic
problems already highlighted. As an important aside however, it is:
...wrong for anglophone scholars to presume that all interreligious dialogues should be
carried out in English. A Hindu-Christian dialogue, e.g., could be carried out in Hindi,
Tamil, or another Indian language or in two completely different languages. The dialogue
partners should avoid imposing their own language on the other as the lingua of the
dialogue (Dunbar, 1998, p. 466).
Interestingly,  this  team approach would  allow Martin  Buber’s  5th and  6th criteria  for  authentic
dialogue, namely:
Genuine dialogue does not require that everyone present has to speak, but that no one can
be there as a mere observer. Each must be ready to share with the others, and no one can
know in advance that he or she will have something to say. Genuine dialogue can be either
spoken or silent. Its essence lies in the fact that each participant turns to the others with the
intention of establishing a living mutual relationship (Shapiro, 1989, p. 33).
This genuine dialogue could be achieved because these speaker and observer roles (i.e., speaking
and silence behaviours) are being reciprocally shared by the team members, which in a one-to-one
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situation  could  have  caused  offence  and/or  stalled  the  dialogue.  For  example,  Participant-A
(Christian) speaks their truth and awaits a response from Participant-B (Buddhist) who sits silently,
does not answer, and only succeeds in worrying and possibly offending their dialogue partner by the
apparent inaction, or presumed lack of attentiveness. With team dialoguing, delegates can alternate
between speaking and silent contemplation without causing offence, and the more team members,
the less odious the individual personal stress. For example, J.  L. Sandidge (1992, pp. 240, 241)
reported how the Roman Catholic-Classical  Pentecostal  dialogue initially agreed that each “side
would bring nine persons to the dialogue table,” later upgraded to 12-15 Pentecostal observers with
limited participation roles. However, the size of the panel should not become too unwieldy and
compromise the efficacy of the dialogue.
If the issue is between: (a) having dialogue sessions (however imperfect); or (b) not having dialogue
sessions (because perfection cannot be achieved) then the former is  usually preferable,  as Prof.
Sharpe (1992) grudgingly admitted:
Of course, a semi-secular Christian will be able to meet and converse with a semi-secular
Hindu about matters of secular concern, without loss of temper or face on either side. If that
is the best we can manage, or that circumstances permit, then at least it is better than open
conflict. Where it squares with that which we are sometimes tempered to claim about
dialogue, is another matter entirely (pp. 233-234).
And,  of  course,  whether  dialogue  perfection can ever  exist  is  another  matter  entirely, but  both
Sharpe (1992, p. 233) and Tracy (1990, p. 4) acknowledged the rarity of genuine, in-depth dialogue,
and so one has to make the best  of all  possible worlds. The interesting question of if and how
members of religious dialoguing bodies should or should not engage one another is another fruitful
area for investigation but currently beyond the scope of this work.
Knowledgeable: Understanding Oneself and the Other
While  acknowledging Stanley J.  Samartha’s (1981, p.  42) claim that “the deepest truths of any
religion cannot be distilled into clear, rational, logical, and self-evident propositions to be compared
with  the  truth  of  another  religion,”  one  still  has  to  act  clearly,  rationally  and  logically  when
dialoguing. Why? Because “the sincerity of peoples engaged in dialogue...[does] not necessarily
build up an uncontested credibility of their efforts, nor...[does] it guarantee their efficiency” (Mitri,
1995, p. 22). “The ‘ordinary laypeople’, whether men or women, are the more typical numerically
and may therefore be deemed to have the most  significant voices but may or may not be well-
informed enough to make a contribution” (Morgan, 1995, p. 162). Scott Daniel Dunbar (1998, p.
466)  even  suggested  that  “scholars  should  enter  into  dialogues  with  the  greatest  breadth  of
participants  possible...including  children,  despite  obvious  disparities  in  knowledge.”  Leonard
Swidler (1990c, p. 60) similarly argued that: “Dialogue should involve every level of the religious,
ideological communities, all the way down to the “persons in the pews.””
Although they are interesting inclusivist sentiments, which does have a place during the entire life
cycle of interfaith communications, it is not particular useful advice for formal, official dialoguing.
The allegedly “exclusionary and elitist” (Dunbar, 1998, p. 466) nature of eschewing children and the
average person in the pews is, in reality, just basic fairness:
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Surely no one would want to--or at least, no one should want to--restrict thinking to the
popular level. That would run counter to the nature of our humanity, and indeed would be
inimical to the welfare of humankind...clearly dialogue must be conducted on all levels of
human experience and most certainly on the highest possible level, for it is precisely there
that many of the breakthroughs have occurred and will continue to occur, which then will
greatly liberate the dialogue at the other levels (Swidler, 1990a, pp. 68-69).
Nor does Dunbar’s (1998, p. 466) subsequent argument help resolve the root inequality, namely: “I
agree that dialogue should be between equals  only in the sense that all  participants are equally
teachers and learners.” This is pure semantics and no solution at all because everyone is a teacher
and  learner  in  some  regard,  but  does  that  make  them all  equal?  No!  The  logical  gap  here  is
frequently insurmountable. Dunbar (1998, p. 466) failed in his own goal of keeping “scholars on the
bridge of dialogue instead of the waters of debate.” This lends weight to Pim Valkenberg’s (2000, p.
109) suspicion that  “the word “dialogue” can easily be exploited to cover up a situation where
equality is absent and even unwelcome.”
Officially-selected  and  approved  delegates  must  be  well-informed  and  competent  enough  to
represent their faiths credibly. This entails: (a) being knowledgeable about their partner’s dogmas,
history, sensitivities, and even have “expertise in ethical issues” (Swan, 1998, p. 356); (b) providing
competent presentation of their faith’s propositions; and (c) having dialogue specialists, like D. C.
Mulder (2000, p. 100) who reported: “I limit myself to the relation between Christians and Jews and
between Christians and Muslims.” Indeed:
In interfaith dialogue participants speak responsibly as representatives of their
communions; therefore they should have thorough knowledge of what their communions
teach, and should refuse to sacrifice convictions in the interest of a superficial unity (Early,
1979, pp. 1820-1821).
(See also Baumer-Despeigne, 1989, p. 70; Krieger, 1993, p. 352; Lee, 1991, p. 187). It is certainly
counterproductive  sending  delegates  if  they cannot  represent  the  faith  properly.  It  would  be  a
dialogue sham because:
Openness without the fulcrum of prior religious self-awareness or faith commitments can
weigh nothing in the balance. It is like sewing a piece of cloth with no knot in the thread.
One sews and sews, but no seam results. In the end, one is left with the separate pieces of
cloth, thread and needle (Swearer, 1977, p. 42).
Leonard Swidler (1982, p. 11) even argued that it was “mandatory that each dialogue partner herself
define what it means to be an authentic member of her own tradition.”
Not only must one understand one’s own faith, the dialoguer must have appropriate knowledge of
the Other’s faith, if for no other reason than to allow meaningful dialogue. This requirement was
embodied in Paul Mojzes’s (1978, p. 10) 2nd and 4th ground rules, namely: “Have a preliminary
knowledge of your partner and the position with which you are going to dialogue,” and “Be well
informed about the topic being discussed and present it clearly.” It was also an essential requirement
for Heinrich Dumoulin (1974, p. 37) who argued that: “An accurate knowledge of other religions is
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necessary for the dialogue.  Naturally, the dialogue ought to correct,  supplement and enrich this
knowledge. But a certain preliminary understanding is the indispensable prerequisite for a useful
dialogue.”  Interestingly,  Prof.  Sharpe  (1974)  considered  it  important  to  also  know  the  Other
intuitively:
It is all very well to say that it is more important for the Christian to meet the Hindu as a
man than to meet the man as a Hindu; but the man is a Hindu, and possesses (if this is the
right word) a ‘Hindu mind’, which needs to be understood intellectually, as well as
perceived intuitively (pp. 84-85).
The  general  knowledge  requirement  was  also  inherent  in  the  conclusion  of  the  Theological
Advisory Commission of the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences (1989, p. 110): “We need
to be conscientized and helped to free ourselves from prejudices, attitudes of self-defence, and of
seeking merely our own benefit by becoming open to the positive values in other religions, and
ready to learn from them.” For Reender Kranenborg (1987, p. 129), this ready-to-learn-from-them
attitude required that the church “should meet and speak with the adherents of the NRMs [New
Religious Movements] directly and read carefully the literature they themselves produce.” Why?
Because  many reviewers  had  never  met  any of  the  groups  or  read  any of  their  literature,  just
secondary sources  and ill-informed opinions!  Technically,  they are speaking from a position  of
ignorance.
A similar hands-on attitude was advocated by Prof. Sharpe (1977). He required dialoguers to have a
variety of other faith friends, and more importantly, direct personal experiences that went beyond
the world of books. Because:
...a Christian missionary who has spent half a lifetime working among the ‘popular’
Hinduism of the villages of Tamil Nadu has a different image of the encounter from that of
the Western student, whether liberal, Barthian, Neo-Thomist or whatever, who has never set
foot in India, but who is attracted by certain of the propositions of Advaita Vedanta (p. 133).
In short, advocating experience of the real Other, as opposed to a projected Other; which had driven
David Tracy’s (1990, p. 4) ten year passion for interreligious dialogue. Obviously, Prof. Sharpe
(1992) felt strong about it because he repeated the sentiment:
...a fair proportion of recent Christian literature on the subject [theories of dialogue] seems
to have been put together by people who appear never to have lived outside a Christian
milieu, and who may have no Hindu, Muslim, Jewish or Buddhist friends...in many cases
they have lived in a modern Western post-Christian milieu, most commonly that of the
secular university (I am tempted to say, with the seminary running a close second)... (p.
233).
This assessment still rings uncomfortably true today.
The reporting of other faith friends within the literature is not very common, but when it does occur
it can be delightful (see Gordis, 1991, p. 467). Indeed, having interreligious friendships was deemed
a new Christian theological  virtue by James L. Fredericks (1998, p. 164) because these friends
contributed to the “decentering of the ego, and the expansion of our horizons...[it]  exposes our
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presuppositions  and  confronts  us  with  our  misperceptions.”  The  Other’s  “new  stories  are  a
tremendum and  also  a  fascinans...  [with  the]  power  to  redirect  our  doing  and  stimulate  our
imagining. In this way, the strangeness of the stranger itself can become for us a resource for the
cultivation of our souls and the appropriation of truth” (p. 165).
Such friendships are also important pragmatically. An “ecumenical initiative rarely makes
significant progress without the bonds of friendship and collegiality...Through genuine friendship
the “change of heart” which Vatican II placed at the center of ecumenism, is able to happen and its
fruits are able to become visible” (Crow, 2000, p. 97). After all, “dialogue can only take place
among persons; systems cannot converse with one another” (Burrell, 2000, p. 44). Indeed, for
earnest Christians, Jesus considered his followers not as servants but as friends (John 15:15 KJV),
but before one can be Jesus’s friend one must learn to befriend one another (1 John 4:21 KJV). So,
why not adopt this Nazarene strategy to interreligious dialogue? As Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1991,
p. 8) argued: “No one should, in my view, have any views on any other aspect of interreligious
questions until he or she has friends among them.”
Cultivating personal friendships while pursuing the mutually shared commitment to truth is also a
practical virtue. Why? Because it enriches our faith journey, the Other is now transformed into a
valuable companion instead of a rival, and it can be done without ceasing to be the Other (i.e., no
faith dilution nor stressful conversion or colonising demands). As companion-friends, we are now
required to adopt the spirit of civility, correct understanding, and cooperation. These are positive
deeds which will speak far louder than promising words. Indeed, David B. Burrell (2000) is in
concert with this contention and also argued that friendship is the postmodern solution to the spectre
of relativism:
I have focused on friendship as a prerequisite for the quality of intersubjectivity which can
come to substitute for objectivity in a postmodern context. Yet even more internally...the
journey shared with friends becomes a paradigm of that quest for truth which displays to us
the ubiquity and necessity of analogous discourse in negotiating the way set out before us
(p. 62).
While John B. Cobb Jr.  (1982) acknowledged the value of knowing the Other, he did not want
participants to know too much about the Other:
Prior knowledge of the religious tradition from which the other speaks is beneficial to
dialogue. But it is a mistake to demand too much here. If only those Christians who are
scholars in the field of Islamics take part in dialogue with Muslims, the deeper purposes of
dialogue are unlikely to be realized...Dialogue with Buddhism is not primarily the province
of Buddhologists but rather of Christian theologians who are, for the most part, but little
informed about the Buddhist traditions (p. x).
It strongly appears that these “unusual” (Morgan, 1995, p. 162), “rare and wonderful” (Shapiro,
1989, p. 35) dialoguers are becoming even more unusual, rare and wonderful if they have to walk a
tightrope  between:  (a)  specialist  knowledge of  the  Other;  and (b)  neo-ignorance,  which has  an
uncomfortable anti-growth element about it. However, there is merit in going beyond exchanges
between specialists to where it is putatively needed, the benighted. Interestingly, Heinrich Dumoulin
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(1974, p. 37) had prefigured Rabbi Shapiro’s concern two decades earlier when he argued that:
“Interest and study are required to fulfil this condition [accurate knowledge of other religions], and
only a limited number of adherents of the various religions will be able to qualify.” This may simply
have to be accepted for now.
Technical Competence: Argumentation and Presentation Skills
As  an  above  corollary,  dialoguers  should  know  how  to  articulate  their  points  convincingly,
appropriately and effectively. If for no other reason than because poor “communication skills  in
listening,  speaking  and  questioning  cause  communication  barriers”  (Dwyer,  1993,  p.  14).  For
example, during the 1986 Catholic-Marxist Dialogue in Budapest:
...the dialogue was defective from both sides. At times, it was more parallel discourse than
dialogue. Language--not only in a grammatical sense--sometimes seems to have posed a
barrier. Some of the questions asked were irrelevant, leading to tangential points or were
needlessly embarrassing (Pereira, 1987, p. 273).
It is of little benefit having knowledgeable and approved representatives if they cannot do anything
constructive with their knowledge and authority.
In  fact,  many  “ordinary  Jews  or  Christians  lack  the  skills  necessary  to  engage  in  a  deeper,
theological dialogue, and are rightly wary of setting their faith at risk in a confusing enterprise”
(Braybrooke, 1993, p. 105). There is also little benefit having knowledgeable and approved faith
representatives  who  are  not  comparable  scholastically  because:  “Dialogue...presupposes
egalitarianism and what one might call horizontal communication between equals” (Sharpe, 1992,
p. 230), as embodied in Leonard Swidler’s (1983) 7th commandment:
Dialogue can take place between equals, or par cum pari as Vatican II put it. This means
that not only can there be no dialogue between a skilled scholar and a “person in the pew”
type (at most there can only be a garnering of data in the manner of an interrogation), but
also there can be no such thing as one-way dialogue (p. 3).
Marcus  Braybrooke  (1993,  p.  105)  likewise  considered  this  par  cum  pari requirement  to  be
important:  “Dialogue  needs  also  to  be of  equals,  that  is  to  say of  those  with  similar  levels  of
scholarship and study.” Stanley J. Samartha (1981, p. viii) similarly argued that practical dialogue
required  intra-community preparation.  Presumably as  confidence  building  warm-ups:  “Dialogue
between communities of faith separated from each other for so long is unlikely to bear much fruit
without some dialogue within particular communities of faith as preparation for encounters.” Skills
in public speaking, debating and negotiation tactics are obvious advantages here.
Indeed,  Leonard Swidler  (1988)  took the competency notion further  by advocating a  Lawrence
Kohlberg analysis of their cognitive, moral judgement, and faith-ideology development. As such, all
dialogue participants should be at postconventional stage five:
...so as to avoid unwarranted expectations - and subsequent disillusionment. Being
forewarned about what stage potential dialogue participants are at, a sensitive person
should be able to help all concerned to work their way through the necessary prolegomena
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more successfully, and perhaps even more rapidly (p. 39).
If this approach is seriously adopted it might open the floodgates to the entire psychologist’s battery
of psychometric tests (e.g., IQ, personality, interest, attitude).
It  is  perhaps  no  accident  that  the  most  prolific  dialoguers  are  Christians,  Jews  and  Buddhists
because they regularly engage in dialectics during their socio-religious training. As Tenzin Gyatso,
the 14th Dalai Lama of Tibet, recounted concerning the Tibetan system of monastic education:
Wit is an important part of these debates and high merit is earned by turning your
opponent’s postulates to your own humorous advantage. This makes dialectics a popular
form of entertainment even amongst uneducated Tibetans who, although they might not
follow the intellectual acrobatics involved, can still appreciate the fun and the spectacle. In
the old days, it was not unusual to see nomads and other country people from far outside
Lhasa spend part of their day watching learned debates in the courtyard of a monastery. A
monk’s ability at this unique form of disputation is the criterion by which his intellectual
achievements are judged (Gyatso, 1990, p. 26).
Making fun of your dialogue partner during an interreligious event would certainly not be approved
of, but if wit and humour can be injected in a spirit of good will, then so much the better. No one
seriously expects dialogues to be dry, humourless events, or would want them to be, indeed, to
“insist that dialogue must always be about clear and distinct ideas is to impose a narrowly Western
verbal-doctrinal style. What occurs, then, is nothing but a more subtle form of religious imperialism.
Exchanging jokes and anecdotes is also a form of dialogue” (Cox, 1989, p. 15).
Admittedly, orientating to this humorous focus may require patience, as evidenced by Harvey Cox
(1989):
When I was living among Tibetan Buddhists, for example, it took me some time to
appreciate the frolic-some way they approach even the deepest tenets of their faith. They
sometimes called it “crazy wisdom.” I found that, as a Christian, I eventually had to lay
aside the notion that dialogue must always be serious...Perhaps we need to place the
“theology of play” at the service of interfaith encounter...(p. 14).
Indeed, it can be a very serious dialogue tool. “Playfullness is a practical way to surrender...the
presuppositions  that  have  become  established  in  our  lives  in  order  to  experiment  with  new
possibilities of identity and action” (Fredericks, 1998, p. 166), including interreligious reflection,
acknowledgment and self-realisation. In fact, during playful:
...interreligious friendships, religious traditions become present to us in the spontaneity of
human speech and action and are no longer constrained by the limits of the text. The truths
of religion cannot be exhausted by inscription. Friendship between followers of different
traditions helps us to resist the tendency to reduce religious forms of life to textuality. In the
friend, the religious Other is present not as an abstraction on paper but as an embodied
truth in all its historical ambiguity...within its living, existential context (Fredericks, 1998,
pp. 167-168).
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If dialoguers are not as well prepared as their partners per session, then all might come to naught, as
embodied in Raimundo Panikkar’s (1975, p. 408) II:1 principle: “There must be equal preparation
from both sides, both theologically and culturally. Otherwise, misunderstandings very easily creep
in.”  However,  even this  preparation requirement  is  not  without  its  own inherent  problems.  For
example,  Mary Hall  (1987,  p.  29)  reported  how her  attempts  at  thorough dialogue preparation
resulted in less than gracious suspicions about her personal integrity: “During the preparation of
these [reports] the group leaders visited me regularly, and one morning a Jewish neighbour asked
me, very seriously and politely, what was the reason for the frequent visits of coloured gentlemen
with briefcases to my flat!” The religious suspect was now a sexual suspect.
Articulate: Knowing the Language of the Dialogue
Participants  should  be  capable  of  delivering  their  messages  articulately,  as  distinct  from
knowledgeably,  emotionally  or  rhetorically,  so  that  others  can  understand  them.  It  is
counterproductive  using  such complex  arguments  and  arcane terminology that  understanding is
thwarted.  As Fr.  Walter  Fernandes (1995, p.  95) advised concerning dialogue with the poor,  it
should be “in the language they understand,” no doubt emulating Christ accommodating the people
rather than vice versa (Matt. 9:35). What is needed is intelligibility. It is a simple, obvious point that
is frequently overlooked precisely because of its simplicity and obviousness.
Participants should also couch their information in a language style that is familiar to participants;
for the sake of identification,  understanding and conviction transmission.  As J.  Paul Rajashekar
(1987) argued:
In this process of mutual interrogation our claims for truth (and the claims of others as
well) are put to the test and tempered. This enables us to sharpen our doctrinal claims,
spelling them out not only in terms and categories familiar to us, but also in the language
and categories intelligible to our dialogue partners. A dialogical theology therefore needs
to be “multilingual” rather than “monolingual” in order to make its own claims
communicable (p. 15).
One must also be cognisant of the pragmatic need for a common language for coherency purposes.
It  is  important  that  the  faiths  put  their  best  feet  forward,  and event  organisers  ensure  it.  If an
undesirable  state  of  affairs  is  allowed  to  happen,  then  not  only  are  the  specific  sessions
dysfunctional, the entire dialogue enterprise is put in jeopardy due to “bad press.” It is also a gross
disservice  to  the religions involved,  especially if  publicly disparaged in  the media (secular and
sacred) because of their poor showing. Regrettably, biased media coverage is an inherent problem
worldwide:
One of the things that those involved in the academic study of religions often have to
unravel for students is the negative imaging of both major religious traditions such as Islam
and many new religious movements (in this context designated as sects or cults) in the
media. More rarely do the media present pictures of people of different religious traditions
celebrating, talking, praying, eating or joining together in positive ways (Morgan, 1995, p.
165).
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The  media  can,  of  course,  sabotage  the  dialogue  before  it  starts,  as  Aelred  J.  Pereira  (1987)
reported:
Before the conference [1986 Catholic-Marxist Dialogue in Budapest] there had been
warnings in the press about the futility and even impossibility of dialoguing with Marxist
scholars who are linked with political power, and about the risks of being led into
compromises of the Christian position and of being exploited for political propaganda (p.
265).
Media skills is therefore another item to add to that ever-growing list of delegate competencies.
Appropriateness: Issues of Dress and Other Nonverbal Behaviours
Each participant officially representing their faith will want to come to the dialogue attired in the
sartorial elegance reflective of the occasion and their proud religious heritage. This is one of the
most striking features observable at such a gathering; a time and place where orange robed Hindu
swamis and Rajneesh can accompany grey and saffron robed Buddhists. Clergy-collared Protestants
pass by white-mantled nuns. Black-robed Zen monks and Orthodox priests with their flowing robes,
hoods and beards pass by Rastafarians with their dreadlocks, in the company of Hassidics with their
side-burns and hats, shaven-headed monks, and blue-suited Mormons with their obligatory short-
back-and-sides. White and blue turbaned Sikhs can be seen alongside Jews with skull caps, fez-
wearing Muslims, business-suited rabbis, cassock clothed Catholics, Nehru-jacketted Indians and
numerous multicoloured saris, gowns, sashes, veils and head scarfs of Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu
women.
Likewise, Catholic rosary beads can be seen alongside Mahikari omitama pendants in the company
of feathered and leopard-skinned Africans, or Tibetan Buddhists with their prayer wheels, drums
and bells. Jews can be seen wearing their parchment filled batim-houses of the tephillin upon their
heads and strapped to their arms, and other associated phylacteries. There are also the numerous
assortments of crosses to be found. Whether they be small unobtrusive ones worn on the collars of
civilian-clothed priests and nuns, or ostentatiously embroidered on the backs of Bishops’ robes, or
hanging pendulously around Greek Orthodox necks.
All this is made more sensuous when surrounded by chanting and prayers, gongs and silence while
the smells of herbs,  flowers,  candles and incense from Shintoists,  neo-pagans,  Zoroastrians etc.
gently waft over the attendees. Each day can be filled with Jews reading the Law, or Buddhists in
meditation  near  genuflecting,  self-crossing  Catholics,  hand-waving  gurus,  tai-chi  practising
Chinese,  yoga  practising  Hindus,  and  Moslems  dutifully  kneeling  on  their  prayer  mats  after
completing their various ablution rituals. In short, there is a virtual microcosm of Earth’s religious
macrocosm.
Such  variations  in  dress  sense  and  behaviour  must  be  respectfully  tolerated  and  no  deliberate
offence is to be assumed by any delegates. However, some may be tempted to be insulted for good
religious reasons. Generally speaking, Fundamentalist Christians like Jehovah’s Witnesses consider
it an insult to wear anything on one’s head while in God’s house (Watch Tower Bible and Tract
Society of Pennsylvania/  International Bible Students Association, 1988, p. 1052). Whereas, the
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Jews honour the reverse behaviour, they need to cover their heads in their temples and synagogues
as a sign of religious respect (Ausubel, 1975, p. 191).
It  is  incumbent upon event  organisers  to  judiciously inform participants  of potential  sources of
insults  beforehand,  whether  via  conference  handouts,  special  letters  or  by  private  talks.  The
potential problems and suggested responses will hopefully be put in their rightful perspective before
any major incidents occur. It is also the religion’s obligation to prepare their delegates in this way.
If a Sikh suffers abuse to do with his wearing a turban, or an Australian is the butt of jokes
about kangaroos and beer, then it is no good blaming the turban or the kangaroo. The
barrier to free and friendly communication is in the mind of the person offering the abuse or
making the joke. Once more it may be seen that meanings are in the mind, not in the sign
(Dimbleby & Burton, 1985, p. 83).
This makes the Victorian Ethnic Affairs Commission’s advice about cross-cultural encounter even
more appropriate:
Be aware that there are many differences in non-verbal behaviour between cultures and try
to familiarise yourself with cultural differences in the areas of gesture, facial expression,
touching, eye contact, posture, distance and clothing...Learn about offensive non-verbal
behaviour in different cultures and avoid them (Community Education Unit, 1988, p. 97).
However, it is up to each participant to decide if,  how, and in what way to accommodate their
partners during the dialogue. If it  is not a particularly important or sensitive concession,  then it
should  be  encouraged as  a  sign  of  respect  for  the  Other.  If  it  is  an  important  issue,  then  the
organisers should be chastised for allowing it to become an issue at all, it being indicative of poor
planning/Chairmanship, and then they should set about coming to a compromise.
Similar consideration should also be shown to the participants during the dialogue. For example, a
Catholic delegate might be fiddling with his rosary beads while listening to the Other, but this does
not necessarily indicate boredom, inattention or a snub; rather, it could indicate deep concentration
achieved through this traditional meditative technique. If dialogue partners realise this beforehand,
then potentially offensive behaviours can turn into sources of pride precisely because the Other did
take them seriously. What was previously coded as a “distraction” is now categorised as respectful
pre-feedback behaviour.
Indeed, there are many ways that people can show that they are paying attention, for example, by:
(a) nodding their heads; (b) looking directly into the delegate’s eyes, whether some, most, or all of
the  time they are  speaking;  (c)  averting the eyes and placing the  head in  a  way that  indicates
listening; (d) using appropriate sounds in the right places (e.g., ‘uh-huh’, ‘oh?,’ tongue-clicking); (e)
using words  that  show one  is  following the  speaker’s  content  (e.g.,  ‘Really?,’  ‘Did  she?’);  (f)
completing, or echoing, the speaker’s sentence; (g) remaining perfectly silent; or (h) rocking one’s
head from side to side (O’Sullivan, 1994, p. 74). Numerous non-verbal factors can be addressed in
this way. However, even these behaviours have to be applied judiciously because of their variant
cultural interpretations. For example, direct eye-to-eye contact can be coded as offensive because
staring, a common Western practice, may be interpreted as intrusive and impertinent rather than an
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indication of a serious willingness to understand the Other. Alternatively, being silent, closed eyed,
or  looking  down  or  away from a  delegate,  a  typically Eastern  practice,  may be  interpreted  as
weakness, deception or snubbing rather than humility, or possibly even a courtesy gesture of ritual
submission.
Nonverbal behaviours have the potential to confirm and repeat verbal behaviours, of denying and
confusing them, of strengthening and emphasising them, or of controlling and regulating what is
happening.  Yet,  surprisingly, only a  few authors  have suggested that  their  sacred servants  take
important notice of facial expressions and body language (Pieterse, 1990, pp. 238-239). There is no
doubt that each faith could supply innumerable examples of potentially offensive behaviours which
event organisers should be aware of, and then try to prepare an appropriate response strategy.
Conclusion
The decision of who should officially be allowed to participate in formal religious dialogues is not
simple, easy or unproblematic. Further research is needed to fully explore these contours. What is
clear is that successful religious dialoguing is premised upon both organisers and delegates having a
clear and sober understanding of the pragmatic conditions of the dialogic enterprise and its many
attendant needs.
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